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SERVICE BY PUBLICATION
1935 CODE
By MORTIMER STONE, ESQ., of the Colorado Bar
Sec. 36-7 Contents of Summons
45 Service by Publication
Sec.
Sec. 46-7 Domestic CorporationDefendant
Sec.
50 Unknown Defendants
Supreme Court Rule 14 A. Service by Publication
'35 C. S. A. Chap. 56, Sec. 5, Service in
Divorce
When Allowed:

I

Only in cases of attachments, foreclosure, claim and delivery or other proceedings where specific property is to be
affected or the procedure is such as is known as a proceeding
in rem. Stock in a Colorado corporation has situs in Colorado wherever the certificates may be, so subject to proceeding
in rem, 97 Colo. 485.
Return of Summons:

II

Must be not less than 10 days after issuance.
Must show and set forth the efforts he (sheriff) has
made to obtain service and the reasons for his failure (rule
14a).
Must show such real and bona fide efforts as shall satisfy
the court or a judge thereof (rule 14a).
If defendant is a domestic corporation,sheriff shall make
special affidavit that he has been unable to find the principal
office of the corporation at the place designated in the Articles
of Incorporation and can find no officer, stockholder or other
person upon whom service can legally be made and shall set
forth the efforts he has made to obtain service and the reason
for his failure (1935 Code, Sec. 46).
Where Sheriff is a party to action, service and return
must be by coroner.
Sheriff or person attempting to make service is not required to go outside the county in which the action is brought
in search for a defendant (84 Colo. 459).

251

252

DICTA

Date of Return is not the date of Sheriff's Certificate of
Return but of its actual filing or return in the Court.
Alffdavit for Publication: III
By Whom Made: By plaintiff or one of plaintiffs unless non-residents or absent from the county.
For resident corporation plaintiff must be by agent
rather than by attorney (67 Colo. 555) and his authority
should be stated.
If made by attorney, showing that plaintiff does not
reside in the county or absence of plaintiff therefrom shall be
made.
Before Whom Acknowledged: Cannot be acknowledged by attorney for plaintiff.
When Filed: The affidavit shall be made after the return and not more than ten days before the order (rule 14a).
"After the return" means after its actual filing in Court.
Contents of Affidavit: That cause of action exists
against the defendant.
(Not so now-Code '77.)
That defendant resides out of the stateOr has departed from the state without intention to
returnOr conceals himself to avoid the service or processOr cannot be found in the county where the case is
pendingAnd that his residence and whereabouts are to the plaintiff unknown.
(Allegation in the alternative and in words
of statute is sufficient, 67 Colo. 189.)
Must give the address (rule 14a, post office address) of
the defendant if knownOr state that the address (post office address) is not
known to the affiant. This may be upon information and
belief, provided the affiant not only states that he is informed
and believes but adds that he so states. Probably the better
form would be to state that the defendant's post office address is not known to the affiant but that he is informed and
believes and so alleges that the post office address of defendant is case
(67 Colo. 548).
In case where the residence or post office address of any
defendant is not stated, the affidavit shall show and set forth
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in detail to the satisfaction of the court or judge the efforts
that have been made to discover such residence or address
(rule 14a) and the court may examine witnesses or the affiant or require further search.
In Case of Divorce: (Chap. 56, Sec. 5, Colo. Stat.
Ann. '35 C. S. A.)
Apparently service by summons is only proper where
it is impossible to obtain personal service, either within or
without the state. Application should be made under oath
and should show that:
Defendant's location is unknown to plaintiffOr the defendant conceals himself or herself in Colorado
so that the summons cannot be personally served upon him
or herOr that the plaintiff has no knowledge or notice, direct
or indirect, of where the defendant can be found within or
without the State of Colorado.
The application shall further state fully and in detail
all of the efforts made by the plaintiff to procure personal
service of the summons on the defendantAnd all of the knowledge of the plaintiff concerning
the location of the defendantAnd shall state all the facts within the knowledge of
the plaintiff which might assist in learning the address of
the defendant.
In Case of Unknown Parties: 1. In Civil action
known as an action in rem.
2. Entitle defendants as "all unknown persons who
claim any interest in and to the subject matter of this action."
3. Allege in Complaint:
(a)
That there are, or that he (any party) believes
there are persons interested in the subject matter of the action,
whose names are unknown to him.
(b)
Describe the interest of such persons and
How derived, so far as his knowledge extends.
(c)
IV
Order for Publication:
Should find that the return of the sheriff properly sets
forth the efforts he has made to obtain service and the reason
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for his failure, and such real and bona fide efforts to obtain
service as has satisfied the CourtIn case either the residence or post office address of any
defendant is not stated in the affidavit, the order should find
that the court is satisfied by clear and convincing proof that
such defendants cannot be reached by mail or by personal
serviceIf defendant is a domestic corporation (Sec. 47), the
court should further find that it satisfactorily appears that
due diligence has been exercised by the sheriff to obtain service without avail, and order that service shall be had by publication in the manner provided by law for service upon nonresidents in case of attachment.
Order should direct publication to be made in a public
newspaper published in the county and should find the paper
designated to be a public newspaper.
Should require publication at least once a week for four
successive weeks.
Should provide that the clerk shall mail a copy of the
summons duly stamped to each defendant whose address is
given in the affidavit at such address forthwith.
In Case of Divorce: ('35 C. S. A. Chap. 56, Sec. 5).
The statute provides that the court shall, upon the hearing of the application (affidavit for publication) carefully
examine the plaintiff and such other witnesses as shall be
produced, in order to determine what steps shall be taken
to notify such absent defendant of the pendency of the action.
Accordingly, it would appear that the order for publication
should recite the filing of the application under oath, the calling up of the same for hearing, that the court carefully examined the plaintiff and such other witnesses as were produced in order to determine what steps should be taken to
notify the absent defendant of the pendency of the actionThe court should find that it is "satisfied of the good
faith of the plaintiff" and should order what steps should be
taken to notify the defendant, presumably by ordering the
clerk to mail a copy of the summons duly stamped and addressed to him at his last known place of residence and post
office address.
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In Case of Unknown Parties: The court or judge in
vacation shall make an order for publication of summons,
as in case of non-residents.
Should not the order comply with rule 14A
(Quaere:
and find that the return and affidavit show such real and bona
fide efforts of the sheriff to obtain service upon and of the
plaintiff to discover the names, residences and postoffice addresses of the unknown defendants as to satisfy the court?)
Mailing Copy Summons:
V
The clerk shall mail to each defendant whose address
is given in the affidavit a copy of the summons duly stamped
at such address forthwith.
Affidavit of Mailing:
VI
Clerk should make affidavit showing the addressing,
stamping and mailing of copy summons to each such defendant.
Time for Default:
VII
Form of summons was changed in 1929 to recite 30
days instead of 40 days to appear in case of service by publication but the section preceding (1935 Code Sec. 36) has
not been changed and still provides as before that the summons shall require the defendant to appear and answer within 30 days if served outside the county or by publication.
The Code provides that service shall be complete at the
expiration of 10 days from the date of the last publication
so that 40 days would appear to be sufficient unless the failure to serve a copy of the complaint would give another ten
days under Sec. 36. Under the old form of summons, default was due at the end of 50 days, and it is safe practice
to wait that period now.
In Case of Divorce: Time within which defendant
shall plead not stated but statute provides for 50 days when
served personally outside the state of Colorado and that the
summons be published "in the same manner and with like
effect as is now provided by law for publication of summons in cases of attachment" (1917). (Manner and effect
of publication has not been changed by subsequent amendments.)

FRAUDULENT CLAIMS
An Address Before The Law Club, September 14, 1938,
Denver, Colorado

FRAUDULENT

By ROBERT C. NELSON, of the Denver Bar

claims implies operation by someone
schooled in the finer points of deception in the propagation of personal injury claims. The term does not
include those claims where the injury is bona fide; those claims
where an accident has actually happened and a lawyer is zealous in procuring the largest possible settlement for himself
and his client. They do not include frivolous claims, however poorly established they may be by fact. What I am
speaking about was quite adequately paragraphed by Westbrook Pegler some years ago in the World Telegram. He
wrote: "In deploring the ethics of the legal profession, it is
customary to overlook the fact that a large proportion of the
citizens have become shyster minded themselves and go
through life hoping to be flicked on the flask by a rich man's
limousine, disappointed in love, thrown out of a solvent
hotel, insulted, libeled, frightened, humiliated, or barked at
by a dog whose owner lives in a big house. Quite aside
from the small criminal element of professional plaintiffs
who are constantly having painful accidents on the common
carriers and in department stores and suing for $100,000 a
crack, there is a tendency among people to think in terms of
damages, evidence and law suits in every conceivable mishap
or close call that befalls them. This is no special failing of
the poor, being common among people who are middling
well to do and is the cause of much of the clutter, delay and
perjury in the courts.
"A man crosses a street against a traffic light, leaps to
avoid a car, barks his shin against a curb, yells murder with
great presence of mind, demands an ambulance and puts in a
week's time malingering in a hospital over an injury whose
proper treatment would be a dab of iodine and a jolt of
Scotch. In due time his attorneys notify the attorneys for
the insurance company that he has suffered great pain and
will have to go on crutches the rest of his life in addition
256
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to which his little woman has suffered the loss of his services,
the whole bill amounting to $100,000.
"A suburban lady comes staggering out of a cocktail bar
of a hotel which is making money, begins to yodel and perform the split in the lobby and is firmly but gently shown
outside by the house detective in the honest performance of
his duty. Two weeks later it develops through the affidavits
of friends who were lushing with her at the bar, that the
plaintiff drank nothing but nutritious stingers, prescribed by
her physician as a remedy for anemia, and that she was not
plastered but just suddenly faint, not yodeling but crying
for help, not doing the split but swooning. Therefore she
has been publicly humiliated to an extent which cannot be
compensated for a nickel less than $50,000.
"The vast profusion of lawyers with nothing much to
do for eating dollars doubtless accounts for much of this
abuse, but the psychology of the citizens themselves is an
important factor since the people began to become acutely
aware of their legal rights.
"The shyster spirit of the citizens themselves is fouling
the courts with many claims for injuries which in people of
reasonably decent conscience could be repaired with a nickel's
worth of sticking plaster, a rock thrown at the barking dog,
or a good hard punch on the house detective's nose."
Unquestionably the attitude of the people, as noted by
Mr. Pegler, plays a large part in the fraudulent claim. It
may have been the underlying cause of the creation of those
worthless groups of lawyers, doctors and laymen who prey
upon the public through their fraudulent claims. Certainly
groups, gangs and rings of the trash of the professions did
not exist years ago. Their advent has been fairly recent.
Of course there was always the petty chiseler capitalizing on
an inconsequential happening. But the big business of accidental injuries followed closely upon the era of big business
generally. Money seemed easy. Prize fights drew million
dollar gates. Money came easy and went easy except for
those who did not care to do even the slightest amount of
work necessary to get it honestly. So there came upon this

258

DICTA

country a curse known as fraudulent claims. Faked injuries.
Faked accidents. Crooked lawyers. Lying doctors.
Perjured witnesses. Thieving insurance adjusters; and claimants with wholly feigned, pre-existing or self inflicted injuries. The combination of layman, doctor and lawyer is
a hard one to whip when operating legitimately but even
harder to unravel when each is playing his part in a nefarious
scheme to mulct some defendant.
The swindling of insurance companies, railroads and
public utilities has kept tempo with the growth and prevalence of racketeering in this country but even as new agencies
have been created and have taken their place as "gang busters", so have the insurance companies, railroads and public
utilities created agencies to "bust" their cases as I will later
show you.
There is no way to determine with the slightest accuracy
the extent of the toll exacted by this fraud. Whenever an
individual confesses or a gang is convicted there is usually
an effort made to estimate the amount which such gang has
taken. These figures are hopelessly inaccurate but authorities say that conservatively the cost to legitimate business
runs into the millions every year.
Let me give you a few of the more classic examples of
how such people operate. One of the first big time operators of the sort came to our attention in Brooklyn in 1930.
Here a holder of liability insurance reported that while driving his car on the streets in Brooklyn and in dodging out of
the way of a taxi, he ran up onto the sidewalk and injured a
pedestrian. The assured was Carmelo Micalizzi. The injured was Frank Brancato. The insurance investigator became suspicious of the case notwithstanding the report of
two doctors of unquestionable ability who examined the man
and said he had an injury causing complete paralysis which
would be permanent.
The company involved employed
Michael Fiaschetti, a detective, whose reputation may be
known to some of you. After several days work Fiaschetti
procured a release signed by Brancato for a consideration of
$1.00! This followed the procurance of confessions from
Brancato's wife and daughter outlining how Brancato would
feign the injury after the fake accident, then dope himself to
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simulate a condition of paralysis. Fiaschetti learned that
this man was being used as a victim by a group of Sicilian
members of a large ring.
Another company had a few
months previously paid this same Frank Brancato $5,000.00
for injuries which were almost an exact duplicate of those
simulated in this accident.
Then there are those cases where an arm or leg is actually
broken with a rolling pin; legs and backs scraped with a grate;
backs and bodies treated with a suction device to create an
appearance of bruising, and the victim shoved or caused to
fall at the side of a taxicab, bus, train or some other vehicle
which the operators know is financially able to respond in
damages or preferably, made to appear to have been hit by a
friend who is in on the deal and who will admit all liability
so as to indicate a prompt settlement by the friend's insurance company.
A rather humorous affair occurred in Chicago in 1937.
Two tramway cars collided with a terrific impact and all
passengers were injured. George West, then an attorney in
Chicago, heard of the accident through his runners. He
rounded up 23 people who in addition to 20 others, filed
claims for their injuries with the street car company.
But
imagine the surprise of the company's investigators, to say
nothing of Mr. West, when it was discovered that these 23
persons claimed to be passengers on one of the cars which was
locked and running empty to the barns because of bad brakes.
Mr. West told the story from his residence in the Cook
County Jail. But it isn't often that shrewd ambulance
chasers make that sort of mistake. I know a couple who
have agents in hospitals, in ambulances, in police radio cars,
and innumerable other places, who for a commission, notify
the lawyer as soon as they hear of an accident if the lawyer
has not already gotten chasers out on it as the result of information picked up on their short wave radio.
One lawyer not so shrewd was Edward A. Housman.
He studied law at Columbia after forging a doctor of law
degree from Princeton. But he did graduate from Columbia
and not finding his practice lucrative got himself confined
in a New York penitentiary on a charge of Grand Larceny.
In 1934 he was convicted of practicing law without a license
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but he was a persistent person and was arrested again while
found arguing a motion in court. While on bail he opened
another law office in New York under a new name which
he found convenient to adopt. But the files in his office
were seized. There the officers found evidence which resulted
in the arrest of Dr. Abraham Benjamin of New York. Apparently Housman and Dr. Benjamin were operating a lucrative fraudulent claim racket, for many claimants, clients of
Housman, said they had never seen Dr. Benjamin-although
Housman's files contained reports on his examination of those
clients.
As will be seen from the foregoing examples, the lawyer
is not the only important cog in the wheel of fraudulent
claims. Without the crooked doctor to help him, the lawyer
may encounter much difficulty. The substitution of X-ray
plates is one of the oldest rackets yet one of the hardest to
discover. On an X-ray plate there is not much to enable a
layman to discover whether the X-ray was taken of the particular claimant who suffered no injury, or that of some other
person who actually had the injury of which the claimant is
complaining. About the only certain way to obviate the
possibility of such nefarious practice by certain physicians
is to require X-rays made under the supervision of some physician in whom the defendant can be entirely confident. Such
substitution is dangerous, for if discovered, as has happened
many times, there is not much difficulty in making out a case
against the physician.
Speaking of X-rays, I am reminded of an amusing incident which occurred in Chicago early this year. A workmen's compensation case was being tried before the Industrial
Commission. The claimant had been X-rayed after his alleged injuries but the plates could not be found by anyone.
Each party thought the other had confiscated them. Claimant's counsel was known to have a propensity for demanding
records and files from his adversary. Defendant's counsel
knew this and felt that this trait might be turned to advantage
in the case on trial. So at the trial the defendant's attorney
was seen to open his brief case and take therefrom many
papers and of all things, an X-ray plate which he casually
laid on the counsel table with his other files. The case pro-
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ceeded and plaintiff put on a doctor who testified about plaintiff's injuries. Plaintiff's counsel then reached for the defendant's X-ray plate lying on the counsel table and handing
it to his witness had his doctor happily identify it as the long
lost plate of the plaintiff's ribs. He went on triumphantly
to point out to the commission just where, on the plate, the
injuries appeared. Defendant waived cross examination and
plaintiff rested. The defendant produced only one witness,
a doctor. After being sworn he was handed the X-ray plate
and asked if he had ever seen it before. He had. Asked
then to further identify it, the doctor stated that he had made
the plate in his office about ten days ago. He then testified
that the subject of the X-ray was not the plaintiff but that
the plate was actually a picture of the ribs and chest of the
defendant's attorney taken after a minor automobile accident.
Witnesses are also a very necessary part of organized
fraudulent claims. A good witness, disinterested and observing, is ofttimes the difference between a good and bad damage suit as you all know. The practice of the claim ring is
to plant their witnesses ahead of the accident. This of course
has its advantages for ready-made witnesses save a lot of
time and trouble.
One interesting outfit which employed this expedient
came to be known as the Falling Womacks after the fashion
of a circus troupe. They fell from one end of the country
to the other, but always in a bus, railroad train, taxicab or
store. Nine of these people were found to have made 65
claims for which they collected over $15,000 in a short
period. Mrs. Womack had fallen no less than 18 times herself. Her three daughters did about as well. Checking back
on their files, these four women were seen to have reported
themselves pregnant in nearly every fall. The nine people
in this gang took turn about being the "fall guy" and the
witnesses.
Apparently when one collected a few bruises
which became uncomfortable, he would recuperate while
doing duty as a witness. These people actually fell so much
that they themselves forgot which case was which. One adjuster went to call on Mrs. Kidmore, one of the troupe, who
had fallen in a store. But it was Mrs. Kidmore who opened
the door for him. She said he probably wanted to see Mrs.
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Womack as it was she who had fallen. As a matter of fact,
Mrs. Womack was waiting for another adjuster in connection with another fall, and the two women could not keep
straightened out as to where they had fallen. And that little
discrepancy seemed important to the adjuster when he remembered that he had paid Mrs. Womack $50.00 for a fall
in still another store a few weeks previously.
The lawyer, the doctor, the injured and the witness
ofttimes find a willing ally in the person of the insurance adjuster. He, like these others, is but human. A few thousand dollars in quick time seems like a bonanza and like
others again, he thinks he can get away with it when his
predecessors have failed and been caught stealing. We saw
a case like that here in Denver a few years ago. This man
operated on a slightly different basis than those dipping into
the fraudulent claim racket, but just the same he thought he
could pad the claims coming to his company and pocket the
proceeds. He spent some time in the penitentiary at Canon
City. I have seen other cases of a similar nature. In one
situation a claim adjuster and an underwriter worked in collusion. The underwriter would report the writing of a
wholly fictitious bond and after a while there would be a
fictitious claim on the fictitious bond and the underwriter
and the claim adjuster would pocket the proceeds of the payment to a fictitious claimant.
In Youngstown, Ohio, a couple of years ago one of the
most widespread and versatile of all claim rings was broken
up. It involved all the classes of persons I have mentioned.
It ran the gamut from faked injuries to real injuries planted
in fake accidents. One company investigating the activities
of its adjuster found that they had paid $2,250 on a certain
claim. The injured woman said she got $677 out of it.
The difference, $1,573, would be a little large for even an
ambulance chasing fee. So continuing their investigation
they found that their own adjuster had pocketed the difference. To accomplish the difficult feat of having the woman
sign a release for $1,000 consideration, and have one to send
to his Home Office showing a consideration of $2,250 the
adjuster merely forged the woman's name to the release for
the larger amount and destroyed the other.
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Now, what can and what is being done to stop this
waste? A waste that causes insurance rates to double and
triple, bus companies to go out of business because of prohibitive rates, public service companies to jack up the cost
to the consumer to have funds with which to meet this awful,
unlawful and vicious drain upon their resources. There frankly was not much done about it until rather recently except
for each victim to pass the cost on to his consumer. This
practice is all right for a while but soon the cost is heavier
than the traffic will bear. This is brought to light by the
howls of commercial clubs, Chambers of Commerce, Kiwanis
Clubs and others when the Bureau of Casualty Underwriters
hike an insurance rate in their locality. Complaint is made
to the companies, the Bureau, the insurance commissions.
But the companies merely point to their profit and loss statement for that locality in justification. We saw this very
thing in Wyoming 2 years ago. Those of you connected
with insurance interests know the repercussion which followed this rate increase. You also know what caused it.
But such remedies are not permanent. They take care
of the situation for the moment but the Womacks and others
keep right on operating. The insurance companies undertook an extensive program a few years ago in an effort to
stamp out organized fraudulent claims. It was thought that
this might be accomplished if properly approached. The
individual fraud case was more difficult. That was a problem which could only be coped with by the victim of the particular fraud and about all that could be done with him was
to see that he did not develop into a mob. This program
includes careful checking of each individual claimant more
thoroughly than was ever done before. His record is compiled and he has the distinction of being assigned a case number, and if he should believe that the game is easy and try it
again, his former sin will visit him with cold certainty in the
form of his prior record being thrown at him wherever he
goes with a claim. For nearly all the insurance, railroad
and public service companiesi now report all their personal
injury claimants to some central reporting bureau. Along
with the claimant's record goes the name of his lawyer and
his doctor and ofttimes his witnesses. Should he crop up
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again somewhere, sometime, his case is easily located and put
in the hands of the person handling the pending claim.
To compete with the organized racket, assistance was
solicited from the law enforcing agencies, the medical societies
and the bar associations. And to the credit of each let it be
said that they did cooperate and much of this nefarious business has been removed like the pulling of a leech from its victim whose blood it was sucking.
Frank Brancato and his gang of Sicilians were convicted
and sentenced in a Brooklyn Court. George West, the Chicago attorney who had 23 people riding an empty car, was
convicted and disbarred. Edward A. Housman, the New
York lawyer, was last sentenced to 2 Y2 years in State prison.
The troupe of falling Womacks was sentenced in the Federal
Court in East St. Louis, Illinois, on February 1, 1938, for
terms ranging from two years for the lesser members of the
gang, to four years for the leaders on charges of using the
mails to defraud.
You probably are asking, just how do you go about
breaking up a racket like this. I can best answer that by
telling you of a case we had here a few years ago. A man
and his wife came into Denver from Nebraska. They made
claims for falls in McCook, I think it was, in Cheyenne, in
Denver, in Manitou Springs. Each was a fall by the man
or the alleged running over of his foot while standing on a
street corner. He probably was using a grater on his foot
but we never could establish that. By the time be had gotten as far as Manitou, we began to get reports back on his
history and record and on comparing notes, developed the
fact of these several claims. And it wasn't long before he
showed up with another claim. But this time an assistant
district attorney was sitting back of the desk of the adjuster
for the insurance company which covered the property where
he last fell. The District Attorney engaged him in conversation about his other accidents; he was identified by each of
the others who had paid for his other falls and finally he
made a confession, was taken to the West Side Court, pleaded
guilty and was sentenced. The information upon which the
District Attorney acted was presented to him by the several
companies which had been victimized by this crook. But
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each company might have made its settlement with him and
closed its file as it does in the thousands of cases handled each
year had it not been for the fact that after the second accident,
each company received from its reporting service, a complete
record of each claim made by the man. When that information showed that the man was operating in Denver and
vicinity, the Denver office of each company using the facilities
of this Bureau was sent a copy of his record. This record
contained his picture, side and front view, his finger print
data, his aliases, and a record of all his accidents. With that
information at hand it was not difficult to identify the claimant wherever he appeared and to arrange a conference where
the District Attotney could be present and the other companies' representatives on hand for identification purposes.
It has been found that this is the only reasonably complete
protection against such practice.
Putting detectives on individual cases often accomplishes
the revelation of fraud as it did when Michael Fiaschetti
started working on Frank Brancato. Following a person
with a moving picture camera is a good way ofttimes to refute
claims of complete disability. But these are individual problems for the individual defendant to cope with as he comes
to them. Individual fraud cases add greatly to the toll exacted by accident gangs and such cases can only be controlled
by individual methods. By making a record of each individual case, that individual is stopped before he starts operations of a fraudulent claim racket. An individual may discover that he is the owner of a hip joint which he can flop in
and out of place like the opening and closing of a jack knife,
and with about as little trouble, or he may have a vertebrae
which is out of place or a portion of his body not sensitive
to pin tests. If there is no way to identify this person
through a central reporting bureau he can go the length and
breadth of the land falling and claiming a dislocated hip, a
fractured back, or paralysis. It has been done and even with
the modern system of classification of such persons, detection
is ofttimes difficult.
Frank Rush, known as James L. Carter and by other
names, who is now 32 years of age, has collected heavily from
insurance companies during the past years because of his abil-
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ity to dislocate his jaw, neck, shoulders, hips, wrists,
knuckles, knees, ankles and toes and to simulate concussion
by self-hypnosis. In January, 1935, he was living in Oakland, California, and made a claim against a rapid transfer
company there for injuries alleged to have been sustained by
a fall while a passenger ascending the stairs of a double-decker
bus on Christmas, 1934. The next day he telephoned from
his bed in an expensive private room in the hospital advising
that three of his cervical vertebrae were fractured and his
neck dislocated. He demanded $10,000 and declared that
if his claim was not settled within 48 hours he would employ
counsel.
The hospital surgeon found that two cervical vertebrae
were dislocated when Rush entered the hospital. The X-ray
failed to reveal any fractures but the two dislocations were
positive. He reduced them, harnessed the patient's head to
the bedstead and secured it with sandbags so that it could not
be moved and intended to encase the neck in a plaster cast in
a few days. He regarded the injury as serious and was convinced that it was caused by the accident. Subsequently
when the defendant's adjuster talked settlement with Rush
the latter accepted $200 but as soon as the adjuster left, Rush
got up, discarded the harness and left the hospital.
The ability to so simulate a broken neck appalled the
doctors and others to such an extent that inquiries were made
of various insurance companies with the result that it was
found that this individual had been operating under various
aliases for some time past and had collected sizeable amounts.
His phenomenal ability to really "break his neck" led to a
comment as to this in the Journal of the American Medical
Association, Vol. 104, No. 15, dated April 13, 1935.
The people who make a business of defending personal
injury actions, i.e. insurance companies, public service companies and railroads, feel that they can cope with the individual layman who thinks he can capitalize on a physical
defect or manufacture his injuries and fake his accidents. But
their difficulties are multiplied a thousand fold when doctors
and lawyers connive with such persons. A doctor's code of
ethics prevents him from giving information about a patient
without the patient's consent. We do not quarrel with the
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doctors on this point. It is a most salutary rule which doctors have established for their own protection and the protection of their patients. But I do not believe that any doctor
who discovers that a patient is malingering or feigning injuries or symptoms of injuries should refuse to divulge this
state of affairs when questioned about the case by counsel
for the defendant whom the patient has sued or contemplates
suing. I cannot feel that the doctor owes the duty of secrecy
to such patient. Certainly if the doctors would reveal any
matters of this sort which they encounter much would be done
to put a severe crimp in the ambitions of the patient. And
doctors discovered creating symptoms of injury where none
exist should be taken to task by the authority under which
they practice and disciplined accordingly. Much good has
been done by the Medical Societies and Boards in helping to
keep their own ranks clean and free from such menaces. Perhaps the medical men have done more than the lawyers on
this situation.
But the bar associations and the courts have cooperated.
We might suggest that some situations have not been dealt
with as severely as they should have been but perhaps the
lawyer cannot forget, even when governing his own profession, that there are rules of evidence which must be adhered
to. Evidence to show that a lawyer knows the character
of his client and the state of his client's mind is often difficult
if not impossible to obtain. This is clearly revealed by a
review of the disbarment cases in our own courts. But even
though the bar still is saddled with this flotsam of the profession in some locations where the tide flows faster than it
does here, those of us who are interested in elevating the bar
to a position of eminence which it has held until recent years,
should turn a mighty cold shoulder upon any client whose
case is not well established by his facts. A person who has
a desire to commit a fraud upon a defendant by the use of
a fictitious injury or accident is not only not entitled to the
services of a lawyer but should be reported to the authorities
by any lawyer to whom he might offer such a case. I realize
that it is sometimes impossible for a lawyer, whether he represents the claimant or the prospective defendant, to judge
the claimant accurately. But there will come a time in the
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progress of most cases when the plaintiff's lawyer is able to
determine to his own satisfaction whether his client's injuries are genuine. And that is the time to act. I believe
that the lawyer owes the duty to himself, his profession, and
the public, to use all means at his command to satisfy himself
whether his client's injuries and other facts are as the client
represents.
We believe that this racket is on the wane. That the
agencies set up to cope with it are doing a good job and have
discovered the method whereby it may be checked if not eliminated entirely. Crime is ever present. Kidnapping continues in spite of the record of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. But who knows what the condition of this country
would have been had it not been for the Lindbergh law and
the G-men. And who knows what the loss to the nation
would have been from fraudulent claims had it not been for
the efforts of the agencies set up to combat those claims. It
is hoped that the loss caused by fraudulent claims may be reduced to an irreducible minimum some day, so that the cost
of insurance will be based upon legitimate loss experience,
the use of the facilities of public service companies may be
based upon pure cost, the charge for rail travel and shipping
will be based upon pure expense and that none will be loaded,
as each is now, with a hidden tax to pay for making peace
with the crooked lawyers, lying doctors, perjured witnesses
and thieving insurance adjusters.

THERE MAY BE SUCH A THING.
To DICTA:
According to the newspaper report of a recent decision in our
Federal Court we have a new crime, viz.: "conscientious participation
(See Rocky Mountain News, September 15,
in a gigantic fraud."
1938, reporting recent decision by Judge Murrah.)
CARLE WHITEHEAD.

JUDICIAL SOLICITUDE FOR ASSASSINS OF
AGNOSTICS*
By FRANK SWANCARA, of the Denver Bar
OURTS have held inadmissible the dying declarations
of persons not believing in supernatural punishments.'
Since even the Supreme Court of the United States, as
if having religious "predilections," solemnly declared that
such statements "may be discredited by proof" that the dying
declarant "did not believe in a future state of rewards and
punishments,"' it is still timely to note the actual and possible
applications of the surviving mediaeval rule indicated at the
outset of this paper, and also of the one last mentioned.
Two thugs were once indicted for the murder of a fouryear-old girl. Shortly before dying, the child made a statement to her mother as to the manner in which she had been
assaulted by the accused. The declaration was not admitted
in evidence. The judicial excuse for the rejection was that
the child was too young to have "had any idea of a future
state." '
No other reason was suggested why the infant might
not have told the truth as to the identity and conduct of her
assailants. The court would have made a like ruling if the
victim had been of mature years and had previously expressed
a lack of belief in heaven or hell. It was, and still is, immaterial whether the skepticism results from an infant's immaturity or an adult's reasoning.
If it is possible for a distracted mother to witness a judicial farce in which the murderers of her child are freed because
the procedure becomes deflected by theological considerations,
it is probable that bereaved children may be compelled to see
unwarranted acquittals of brutal killers of their elders.
Suppose that a citizen who disbelieves in the doctrine of
divine wrath is murdered in cold blood by a fiend who professes orthodox beliefs, and that thereafter a young son of the
victim is present at the trial of the assassin. Assume that it is
known that the deceased while still alive and conscious of impending death named the defendant as the one who inflicted
the lethal blows. The dying declaration is offered in evidence,
*Revision of article in The Truth Seeker (N. Y.) as reprinted in The Lawyer
(Brooklyn, N. Y., June, 1938).
'Swancara, Obstruction of Justice by Religion, 131-147 (W. H. Courtright Pub.
Co., Denver, 1935).
'Carver v. United States. 164 U. S. 694, 697.
'Rex v. Pike, 3 Carr. I P. 598.
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but defense counsel vociferously claims to have proof that the
victim did not believe "in God and a future state of rewards
and punishments." 4
Naturally the boy's innumerable memories of his paternal companion are revived, and he recalls every incident prior
to the end of the funeral. He thinks of his parent's honesty
and truthfulness. He is entirely unprepared to listen to judicial and forensic expressions which assail the character, reputation, or veracity of his father.
After defense counsel shows that a dying declaration
occupies the same position as a living witness with respect to
admissibility and credibility, a court opinion is then adduced
in support of the libel that an unbeliever in hell "is unworthy
of any credit in a court of justice." 5 The boy is compelled to
hear the same shyster also read that an unbeliever in eternal
damnation or in any Deity prescribing it "shows a recklessness
of moral character and utter want of moral sensibility, such
as very little entitles him to be believed." 6 A church-affiliated
trial judge indicates an agreement with, and approval of, such
court opinions, and the grieving son concludes that the Christian on the bench is foully caluminating the dead. If the criminal trial takes place in a small and pious town, it is attended
by numerous spectators. The judge's remarks are heard with
great respect, and gossips proceed to repeat, with additions,
such expressions, construing them in a manner tending to
blacken the memory of the murderer's unoffending victim.
Naturally this circumstance greatly distresses the surviving
members of the latter's family.
During the trial it is possible that members of the bereaved group may hear court or counsel read from a law book
these words:'
"I have known a witness rejected, and hissed out of
court, who declared that he doubted of the existence of a God
and a future state."
If the filial listener is himself, like the late Clarence Darrow,
free of belief in divine vengeance, he will observe that the
'See Donnelly v. State, 26 N. J. L. 463. affirmed in id. 601.
5
Norton v. Ladd, 4 N. H. 444.
"Odell v. Koppee, 5 Heisk. (Tenn.) 88.
'Jackson v. Gridley, 18 Johns. (N. Y.) 97, 103; Stanbro v. Hopkins, 28 Barb.
(N.Y.) 265, 268.
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hisses alluded to were directed against the summoned and disinterested witness, not against the criminal, and he may rightly
conclude that if he himself attempts to testify against the killer
of his father he, the witness, may be "rejected and hissed out
of court," or if he is allowed to remain, hear it said that he "is
unworthy of any credit in a court of justice." The judicial
expressions are no messages of condolence in his hour of sorrow. Instead, these rules of evidence are more subservient to
the cruelty of a Herodias or a Torquemada than to fact finding, and add insult to the injury of children who have had
agnostic parents murdered.
When the dying declaration of a citizen is discredited by
proof of non-belief in hell, both the declarant and his testimony are discredited in the minds of some fundamentalist jurors, and the result is as if he were shown to have been convicted
of some infamous crime. It was an American (not an ancient
English) court that said:'
"* * * It (meaning unbelief in fundamentalist Christian
doctrines) can scarcely fail to deprive him of the esteem of
mankind, exclude him from intercourse with men of piety and
virtue, and render him odious and detestable."
A jury of fundamentalist believers in a religiously revived community, hearing the so-called impeaching evidence
and thereby learning that the victim of the killing was an
"infidel," might be disposed to acquit the murderer upon the
old ecclesiastical tenet that the destruction of a pagan, an apostate, or an unbeliever is as laudable a service to Christian society as is the extermination of noxious insects and rodents.'
What jury is anxious to convict a murderer, not known to
harbor any heresy, when it believes that his victim, now dead.
was, in the chaste language of a Connecticut Christian judge.
"Odious and detestable"? 0
The juridical rule in question, in addition to causing a
stigmatization of the victim's family, obviously aids a murderer to escape paying any penalty for the unjustifiable shedding of human blood. Besides affecting the credibility of the
dying declaration, the practice of permitting evidence of unbe'Stow v. Converse, 3 Conn. 325, 342.
"'All infidels are, in law, perpetual enemies, for between them, as with the Devil,
whose subjects they be, and the Christians, there is perpetual hostility, and can be no
peace." Lord Coke, as quoted in Hairn v. Bridalut, 37 Miss. 209, 226 (1859).
"Supra note 8.
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lief in theological dogmas on the part of the deceased helps the
criminal to "prove" self-defense. It is a favorite trick of killers to claim that the deceased was the aggressor. If when such
a defense is interposed the prosecution offers in evidence the
dying declaration of the victim and the defendant submits testimony, possibly perjured, that the declarant was a non-believer in a "future state," some of the jurors who have had
fundamentalist religious training in infancy may be induced
to believe that the deceased victim was the aggressor and that
the accused murderer did act in self-defense. The juror's reasoning would begin in accord with the following remarks of a
contributor to the Scottish Rite publication, New Age:"
"If the atheist recognizes no God and is, therefore, under
no compunctions about obeying Divine law, how much less
regard has he for man-made law?"
The juror might assume that because the deceased knew of no
"Divine law" he had an antipathy "for man-made law," and
probably assaulted the defendant, compelling the latter to act
in self-defense.
Most Christian judges are willing, without abhorrence,
to permit lack of belief in hell to affect either the competency
or the credibility of dying declarations. Recently the highest
court in Missouri not only upheld and applied the ancient rule
as to the impeachment of dying declarations, without regretting the supposed necessity for so doing, but attempted to
justify its ruling by the citation of precedents. So bold and
emphatic was the decision that the court saw fit to use italics
as follows:"2
"Dying declarations admitted in evidence may be discredited by showing that deceased was a disbeliever in a future state
of rewardsand punishment."
It ought not to be difficult for anyone to imagine the feelof
the family and friends of a murdered man when they
ings
see in their local newspaper the publication of an official opinion containing such a reference to the deceased. It was not the
murderer who was "discredited," nor was it any perjurer or
other felon, but the court meant that it was the aged and unoffending man, the victim of a brutal murder, who could be thus
stigmatized.
"lssue of November, 1928.
"State v. Rozell, 225 S. W. 931.

DIVORCE--SEPARATE MAINTENANCE-REQUEST TO CHANGE PLEA
FOR RELIEF-EVIDENCE-ENTERING FINAL DECREE OVER
OBJECTION OF INNOCENT PARTY-No. 14274-Decided Octo-

ber 3, 1938-Doty vs. Dot y-Dstrct Court of Dener-Hon.
George F. Dunklee, Judge-Affirmed-En Banc.
FACTS: Wife brought suit for separate maintenance. Defendant filed cross-complaint for divorce. During course of trial, plaintiff amended her plea to one for divorce and alimony and jury returned a verdict in her favor. The Court entered Interlocutory Decree and awarded plaintiff th family home in satisfaction of all claims
for alimony. Plaintiff offered proof of her present circumstances to
support her plea for alimony, but the Court rejected the proffer. She
objected to the signing of the Interlocutory Decree, saying that she had
the right to again change her plea to the original one of separate maintenance. This objection was overruled and she moved to dismiss the
entire action, which motion also was denied. The final decree of
divorce was entered subsequently.
1. Evidence leading to the awarding of equity in home
HELD:
in satisfaction of all claims for alimony examined and found to support award.
2. The trial Court is vested with some discretion in matters of
the awarding of alimony and such discretion was not abused in the
instant case.
3. It was not error for the trial Court to refuse plaintiff's request to again change her cause of action to one for separate maintenance.
4. When emotional instability is the only ground urged in support of plaintiff's motion to again change her cause of action, it is not
sufficient reason for compelling trial Court to grant request.
5.
While prior to 1933 a motion by the innocent party to dismiss the action for divorce might have been sustained although coming
after the Interlocutory Decree was entered, such is not the case today.
6. In 1933, the General Assembly declared that public policy
requires that the marital relation and the rights of parties to an action
for divorce shall be finally determined within a reasonable time after
trial, and that when the Interlocutory Decree is entered, the parties
shall be divorced six months after the date thereof, and the same shall
only be set aside for good cause shown after a hearing, and that such
decree shall be a final order as of the date of its entry.
7. The general rule seems to be that a divorce decree will not
set aside at the instance of the successful party.
8. Where it appears that the trial lasted four days, and the
Court was fully advised as to the respective economic status of the par-
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ties, the offer of proof as to plaintiff's needs at the time of the trial was
not improperly rejected, for further testimony on that score would
have been merely repetitions.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Justice Hilliard, Mr. Justice
Young and Mr. Justice Holland, dissent.
POLICE POWER-MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-MANDAMUS-EviDENCE-No. 14276-Decided August 31, 1938-Maurer vs.
Boggs, Mayor, et al.-District Court of Logan County-Hon.
Arlington Taylor, Judge-Reversed-In Department.
FACTS:
Plaintiff brought mandamus action to require City
council of Sterling to issue a license to retail 3.2% beer. The City
Council refused to issue license on ground that location of plaintiff's
business place was on the fringe of the city and out of the regular
business district and that made it too difficult to police the business
and neighborhood with the city's small police force. The trial court
refused the plaintiff relief.
HELD:
1. The action of a city council in refusing a permit to
a citizen, otherwise fully qualified to sell 3.2% beer does not rise to the
dignity of a policy of legal intendment to prohibit sale of such beer
in such neighborhood to all persons for it had not "ordained" in
statutory manner, and published to the world, that it elected to deny
such privilege under its police power. There was nothing to keep the
city from letting someone else have a license, or even letting the plaintiff have a license at a later date.
2. It was error fur trial court to admit in evidence protests submitted to City Council against other applicants for such licenses, and
an exhibit, containing uncomplimentary references to plaintiff where
its signers only asked for an investigation, should have been excluded.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Hilliard. Mr. Justice Young, Mr. Justice Bakke, and Mr. Justice Knous concur.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-No. 14397-Decided September 19,
1938-Pryor Coal Mining Company et al. vs. Contino et al.District Court of Denver-Hon. Otto Bock, Judge-AffirmedIn Department.
HELD:
"An injured workman is not to be denied a finding of
total and permanent disability because not the victim of 'helpless
paralysis reducing bodily functions 'to the minimum essential for the
maintenance of a mere spark of life'.
And though 'able to obtain
occasional employment under rare conditions and at small remuneration'; * * * one may still 'be totally disabled for all practical purposes
of competing for remunerative employment in any general field of
human endeavor.' "
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Chief Justice Burke, Mr.
Justice Hilliard, and Mr. Justice Holland concur.
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CRIMINAL LAW - MURDER - ACCESSORY - EVIDENCE - INFORMATION-INSTRUCTIONS-No. 14335-Decided September 19,

1938-Roberts vs. People-DistrictCourt, Weld County-Hon.
Claude C. Coffin" Judge-Affirmed-En Banc.
FACTS: R. and W. were separately tried for murder of B. Each
was acquitted. After R's acquittal, but before W's acquittal, the district attorney charged R. with being an accessory after the fact to B's
murder by W., but after W's acquittal amended the information charging the homicide to have been committed by a person or persons unknown; and W. was likewise charged as an accessory. R. was tried
first and convicted. The case against W. was dismissed. R. assigns
error.
1. There was no material variance between the charge
HELD:
and the proof and the contention that R. was arraigned on one charge
and convicted on another is not sound since the amendment enlarged
the charge, making it broad enough to cover a murder by any person,
but not eliminating W. as the perpetrator.
2. "Inability to prepare against or even being misled so that
one does not prepare to defend against a specific charge is not prejudicial if that charge is not relied upon and withdrawn from the jury."
3. Evidence of defendant when on trial for murder considered
and found to be sufficient, if believed by jury, to have sustained verdict
of "guilty" on accessory charge since it showed that defendant had
full knowledge that a crime had been committed and that he had
helped to conceal it.
4. In Colorado, the conviction of the principal is not a condition precedent to the conviction of an accessory, although this may
appear to be contrary to the common law.
5. The judgment in the principal felon's case, whether of conviction or acquittal, is not admissible for any purpose against the
accessory.
6. It was not error for court to have admitted testimony of W.
in presence of defendant R., that R. killed B., and that there was a
third party present, for the court properly instructed jury that it must
find beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime of murder was committed by some person "other than the defendant himself."
7. Exceptions going to the form of the information must be
made before trial.
8. There is no compelling reason for holding that the information must state the means by which a concealment of a murder was
committed, particularly when that question is not raised until after
trial.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Young. Mr. Justice Hilliard and Mr.
Justice Bouck dissent. Mr. Justice Holland not participating.
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WILLS--CHARITABLE

TRUSTS-INTERPRETATIONS

OF

CREATIVE

PROVISIONS-No. 14374-Decided October 3, 1938-In re:
Estate of Chucovich us. Jovanovich, etc.-County Court of Denver-Hon. C. E. Kettering, Judge-Affirmed-En Banc.
FACTS:
Plans for a hospital building on the grounds of Denvei
General Hospital, ornamentation, memorial, lobby, etc., were examinec
by County Court and it found that it "is a monument of permanent
and ornamental nature * * * and within the terms of the will" which
appointed trustee to spend not to exceed $100,000.00 as a memoriai
to former Mayor Speer, and to "construct and establish an ornamental
fountain or gate or arch or other suitable monument of a permanent
and ornamental nature, on or at an entrance to the Civic Center, or
on or at an entrance to some other public park or public grounds in
the City * * *".

The Attorney General of Colorado assigned error.

HELD: 1. Where a trust of charitable nature is created in
which the rights of heirs are not involved, such bequests are favored
by the Courts and, in the interpretation of the creative provisions, the
application of liberal rules may be indulged.
2. Where the doctrine of ejusdem generis is applied, it is generally used in connection with other important rules, not the least of
which is a determination of the intent. In .no event should the rule
be applied within narrower confines than such intention which is to
be gathered from the recognized meaning of the Wvords employed.
3. Where the testator clearly states his desire that the monument
be "a memorial in honor and memory of the late Mayor Robert W.
Speer," and gives the trustee instructions to construct same saying, "an
ornamental fountain or gate or arch or other suitable monument of a
permanent and ornamental nature," such a hospital fulfills the instructions.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland. Mr. Justice Bakke not participating.
TAXATION -

CHARITABLE INSTITUTIONS -

LABOR UNIONS

-

No.

14373-Decided October 3, 1938-Lane, et at. vs. Wilson,
etc.-District Court of Denver-Hon. Henry A. Hicks, JudgeAfflirmed-En Banc.
HELD: 1. Real Estate owned by a labor union and used exclusively in furtherance of its objects and purposes is not used for
"strictly charitable purposes" within the meaning of Sec. 5 of Article
X of Colorado Constitution and therefore, is subject to taxation.
2. An organization which is a "beneficial society whose beneficence is confined to the members, their families, depeandents or friends,
and depends upon the contributions made," not voluntarily given, but
assessed against the members, is "not a charity, but a private institution for the mutual advantage of the members."
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Justice Hilliard and Mr.
Justice Holland dissent.
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ESTATES ADMINISTRATOR TRANSFER OF HEIR'S INTEREST
COMPROMISES-No. 14240-Decided October 3, 1938-In

-

re:
Estate of Smith us. Pueblo Savings and Trust Company-County
Court of Pueblo County-Hon. Hubert Glover, Judge-Afirmed
-In Department.
HELD:
1. The Court will not undertake to cancel a deed to
property in an estate from one heir to another in an action for accounting brought by the grantor against the administrator (bank) of
the estate.
2.
Nor will the title of the heir to said real estate be determined
in this kind of an action.
3.
Assuming that the Warranty Deed to plaintiff's brother did
not cover the personal property, since he fails to show that he is entitled to it, he has no cause of action against the bank.
4. An heir may relinquish his rights by an express waiver or
release or by estoppel, and as between the parties, the renunciation
may be in any form which they adopt.
5. Compromises having for their object the settlement of family
difficulties or controversies are favored at law and in equity if at all
reasonable.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Chief Justice Burke, Mr.
Justice Hilliard and Mr. Justice Holland, concur.

RALPH CARR

a distinguished member of the Colorado bar, is
the Republican nominee for governor of Colorado.
Ralph needs no introduction to the legal profession.
tong an outstanding figure In Colrado,
he has made and unquestionably maintains a
splendid reputation for himself as a gentleman.
scholar and able attorney.
The Bar acknowledges him as a credit to the
profession.
Ralph was born 50 years ago In Rosita, down
near Westcliffe, Colorado.
His father
'as
a
hard rock miner and Ralph grew up and attended the grade school and
high school
In
Cripple Creek. He worked as a reporter on the
Victor newspaper.
Upon graduating from high school Ralph went
on to the University of Colorado-still working on
newspapers
to finance his education. Then in
1912.
he received his LL.B.
After practicing
law in Victor and Trinidad. be opened his law
office in Antonito. Colorado, in 1917. There he
served as County Attorney, member of the school
board and of the town council, performing his
duties conscientiously, skillfully and efficiently.
When In 1927 Colorado needed an authority on
water rights. Ralph Carr was selected.
He went
to the state house as first assistant attorney
general.
Two years later he was appointed U.
S. district attorney for Colorado. In his four
years in this federal office, he earned an enviable
reputation and won the respect and admiration
of both his fellow members of the bar and the
public.
Keen, level-headed and Industrious and
unflinching he attained fame as one of the
finest federal officials in the country.
But the readers of Dicta know all thisPerhaps some of us do not know, however.
that Ralph has been fighting a successful battle
for the State of Colorado and its water rights
for the past decade
He played a leading part
in securing the rights saved for Colorado by the
Colorado River compact; and even at the present
time is actively assisting the Attorney General
of our State In protecting the water resources of
Colorado from attacks made by other States.
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